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Abstract:
This study examines how exposure to a televised debate affects young
citizens’ normative democratic tendencies, attitudes that have been linked to
increased civic and political participation, including voting behavior. The
authors also are interested in the confidence young citizens express in the
political knowledge they possess—their political information efficacy—and
specifically how confidence in one’s knowledge may be affected by exposure
to such a sustained and “information-rich” source of campaign information as
a 90-minute candidate debate. Findings reveal that debates strengthen, at
least in the short term, democratic attitudes and also strengthen young
citizens’ levels of political information efficacy.

In late September through mid-October 2004, an average of
53.4 million viewers watched President George W. Bush and Senator
John Kerry in each of their three televised debates (Commission on
Presidential Debates, 2004). This assemblage of viewers, in fact,
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represented the largest audience for presidential debates since 1992,
perhaps a portent that a more interested and engaged electorate
would turn out in greater numbers come Election Day.1 Indeed, in
November 2004, voters recorded their highest level of participation in
a presidential election since 1968, with nearly 60% of eligible voters
casting their ballot. Young citizens—along with all segments of the
electorate—also went to the polls in greater numbers. Although the
rate still trailed that of older voters, turnout for 18- to 24-year-olds
was at 42%, an increase from 36% in 2000 (Center for Information
and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, 2004).
Certainly, during the 2004 presidential campaign, a national
movement was afoot to get young citizens involved in the political
process. From MTV’s “Rock the Vote” and “Choose or Lose” to P. Diddy
and Lil’ Kim’s “Vote or Die” advertising blitzes, voting was marketed to
young citizens as the “cool” thing to do. This drive to recruit more
young voters stemmed largely from the growing lament that our
youngest citizens had become the least represented segment of the
electorate at the ballot box. Until the November 2004 election, only
about one third of eligible 18- to 24-yearolds regularly voted in
presidential elections, compared to approximately 65% of those 25
and older, and as Levine and Lopez (2002) document, the gap in
participation between young and older voters had continued to expand
since 18-year-olds were first granted the vote in 1972.
Can we conclude, therefore, that the many persuasive attempts
and national media campaigns designed to mobilize younger voters
were successful? In fact, we have little empirical evidence to help us
understand if—and perhaps even more important, how—specific
political messages might work to persuade young citizens to vote. The
current study seeks to provide some answers to the perplexing
problem of youth engagement in politics. Although it would be
impossible to fashion a study that captures young citizens’ exposure
and reactions to the full range of political and civic engagement
appeals that make up a presidential campaign, our analysis isolates
young citizens’ reactions to a specific campaign message—the
televised presidential debate. As McKinney and Carlin (2004, p. 204)
note, presidential debates generate the largest viewing audience of
any single televised campaign event. Furthermore, as Pfau (2003)
points out, debates, with their attendant media hype and extensive
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journalistic coverage, may be the only televised political event capable
of attracting the attention of “marginally attentive” citizens—a
segment of the populace we feel includes a great many young citizens.
Our primary interest is to better understand how exposure to a
televised debate may affect young citizens’ latent or normative
democratic tendencies, attitudes that have been linked in previous
research to increased civic and political participation, including voting
behavior. We also are interested in the confidence that young citizens
express in the political knowledge they possess—their political
information efficacy—and specifically how confidence in one’s political
knowledge may be affected by exposure to such a sustained and
“information-rich” source of campaign information as a 90-minute
candidate debate. Finally, through longitudinal analysis, we seek to
understand not only the immediate effects of debate exposure to
normative democratic attitudes and information efficacy but also how
these attitudes may remain stable or evolve throughout the course of
a campaign.
Next, we provide a brief review of studies examining the effects
of debate exposure on democratic political attitudes, as well as a
review of the very few investigations examining the longevity of
debate effects. Following this assessment of the relevant literature, we
posit a series of hypotheses and research questions and present
findings from our longitudinal study that suggest debates do
strengthen, at least in the short term, democratic attitudes and also
strengthen young citizens’ levels of political information efficacy.

Review of Literature
Debates and Democratic Attitudes
A number of studies have examined campaign debates’ possible
latent effects whereby exposure to candidates engaged in televised
debates may activate citizens’ various civic and democratic tendencies.
In general, although this line of research remains underdeveloped,
most findings do suggest that debate viewing positively affects
attitudes of civic engagement and thus can strengthen our political and
electoral processes. Specifically, debates have been found to heighten
viewers’ interest in the ongoing campaign (Chaffee, 1978; Wald &
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Lupfer, 1978), to encourage citizens to seek out additional campaign
information following their debate viewing (Lemert, 1993), and to
encourage greater participation in the campaign, as demonstrated by
viewers’ talking to others about their preferred candidate and
increases in reported likelihood of voting (McLeod, Bybee, & Durall,
1979a; Patterson, 2002).
Of particular relevance to the current project, a few studies
have found debate viewing enhances citizens’ sense of political efficacy
and support for political institutions (Chaffee, 1978; Katz & Feldman,
1962; McLeod, Durrall, Ziemke, & Bybee, 1979b; Sears & Chaffee,
1979), although one study (Wald & Lupfer, 1978) found that viewers
became significantly less trusting of government following their debate
viewing. However, Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco (2000) found that
debate exposure resulted in a significant lowering of political cynicism
levels, and their analysis also revealed a clear link between cynicism
and voting—specifically, nonvoters’ political cynicism was significantly
higher than that of voters. Pfau, Houston, and Semmler (2005) also
found debate viewing to promote such normative outcomes as
increased “political expertise”—which included awareness, knowledge,
and interest in politics—and increased likelihood of participating in the
political process, including voting.
In one of the very few studies to focus specifically on the effects
that a presidential debate may have on young citizens, McKinney and
Banwart (2005) examined college students’ reactions to a presidential
primary debate designed expressly for young voters—MTV’s ‘Rock the
Vote’ debate that took place in the fall of 2003 and featured the
Democratic presidential primary candidates. In this comparative study,
young citizens also were exposed to a “traditional” primary debate not
targeted explicitly to youth voters. McKinney and Banwart found that
the youth-targeted debate, significantly more so than a traditional
debate, encouraged greater identification between young citizens and
the candidates, and viewers of the ‘Rock the Vote’ debate expressed
greater political efficacy, heightened political trust, and decreased
political cynicism.
Our interest in the ability of debates to affect democratic
attitudes and behaviors is in line with Pfau’s (2003) recommendation
for future debate research when, speaking of normative democratic
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outcomes, he concluded, “There are no other more important effects
that scholars could document” (p. 32). With the current study, we are
particularly interested in achieving a clearer understanding of how this
important form of campaign communication may affect young citizens’
attitudes and behaviors. As argued previously, debates are likely to
penetrate the awareness of marginally attentive voters—the very
segment of the populace, we believe, that includes large numbers of
young citizens. Also, with much of the extant debate-effects research
based on general populations of debate viewers, with a notable
exception being the McKinney and Banwart (2005) study discussed
previously, a primary goal of the current investigation is to expand our
knowledge of specific debate effects on young citizens. Within the
broad rubric of democratic attitudes and values, our particular
attention in this study will focus on what Delli Carpini (2004, p. 398)
points to as the principal attitudes of democratic engagement, which
include political efficacy, political trust, and the counterpart to political
trust, political cynicism. Drawing on specific findings from existing
research as a guide, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: Young voters’ political efficacy will increase significantly
after viewing a televised presidential debate.
Hypothesis 2: Young voters’ political trust will increase significantly
after viewing a televised presidential debate.
Hypothesis 3: Young voters’ political cynicism will decrease
significantly after viewing a televised presidential
debate.

Political Information Efficacy
Along with our interest in those normative democratic attitudes
and values that have been shown to produce a more engaged—and
more likely to vote—citizen, we also are interested in another
cornerstone of participatory democracy, the informed voter. Whereas
others have focused a great deal of attention on the cognitive
elements of political information, chiefly the acquisition and processing
of requisite political knowledge (e.g., Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996;
Popkin, 1991), we are more interested in the attitudinal component of
knowledge attainment—specifically, how confident one is in what he or
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she knows. Recently, Kaid, Tedesco, and McKinney (2004; see also
Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007), have advanced the concept of
political information efficacy. This attitudinal concept is grounded in
important theoretical links between general political efficacy and one’s
feelings of confidence in the political knowledge he or she possesses.
Whereas traditional political efficacy has been defined as an
individual’s feeling that he or she has the ability to influence the
political process (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954), the concept of
political information efficacy is defined as the level of confidence one
has in his or her political knowledge and that one possesses sufficient
knowledge to engage the political process through such behaviors as
voting.
The development of political information efficacy as an
important factor in young voters’ behavior stems from a decade of
research examining young citizens’ reasoning for their civic
engagement attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Kaid et al., 2000, 2004,
2007). Through analysis of thousands of young citizens engaged in
focus group discussions conducted throughout the United States
during the 1996, 2000, and 2004 presidential elections, the leading
explanation provided by nonvoting young citizens was that they lacked
sufficient knowledge to participate as an informed voter.
In their initial empirical testing of political information efficacy,
Kaid et al. (2004) utilized both National Election Studies [NES] survey
data and a pilot experimental investigation that showed younger
voters (those 18 to 29) reported significantly less confidence in their
political knowledge than older voters; also, lack of confidence in one’s
political knowledge is significantly related to voting or not voting.
Although additional studies have been conducted using political
information efficacy as a variable of analysis (Kaid et al., 2007), we
have a very limited understanding of a televised presidential debate’s
effect on young citizens’ information efficacy. In their comparative
study, examining exposure to both presidential ads and debates, Kaid
et al. (2005) found that debates may be more helpful than ads in
strengthening young voters’ political information efficacy. As one of
the most information-rich sources of campaign information, debates
offer sustained exposure (typically 90 minutes) to issue and candidateimage information and thus provide the potential to alleviate one’s
concern that he or she is ill-informed about the candidates and
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campaign issues. Yet with little existing research to form a prediction
of debates’ potential effect on political information efficacy, we posit
the following general question:
Research Question 1: Will exposure to a televised presidential debate
have a significant effect on young citizens’ political
information efficacy?

The Longevity of Debate Effects
Although watching a 90-minute televised debate may very well
induce certain immediate effects, are such cognitive or attitudinal
changes lasting? Unfortunately, as McKinney and Carlin (2004) note in
their comprehensive review of presidential debate research, we have
very little detailed knowledge of any lasting effects from debate
exposure—lasting at least until Election Day—and what little evidence
is available along these lines suggests that debate effects are shortlived. Specifically, the few debate studies that have employed a
repeated-measure or panel design, following respondents’ post-debate
responses through postelection, reveal that specific debate effects
evaporate rather quickly. From their examination of both issueknowledge gains and formation of candidate-image perceptions, Miller
and MacKuen (1979) reported that there was “minimal long-term
debate impact on candidate evaluations . . . [and] most important, it is
apparent that the effect of any debate lasted only a few days” (pp.
288-289). Similarly, Sears and Chaffee’s (1979) analysis of the 1976
presidential debate also found “little lasting impact...on evaluations of
the candidates or perceptions of the candidates’ attributes. Each
debate yielded some temporary benefit to the candidate who was the
consensus ‘winner,’ but this advantage seemed to dissipate fairly
quickly” (p. 244). Finally, Wald and Lupfer’s (1978) examination of
debate viewing’s latent effect of strengthening intent to vote also
concluded “that such an effect was only temporary.... One week later,
this effect had largely disappeared” (p. 348).
Although in the short term, debates may be able to positively
affect viewers democratic attitudes—whether by heightening one’s
sense of political efficacy or political trust or by cynicism—or perhaps
even lead one to feel more confident in the knowledge he or she
possesses, are these changes at all enduring? Our longitudinal analysis
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employs a panel design that tracks young citizens who viewed a
presidential debate to postelection, thus allowing us to answer the
following general questions:
Research Question 2: Will young voters’ postdebate attitudes of
political efficacy, trust, and cynicism remain stable or change
by the end of the presidential campaign?
Research Question 3: Will young voters’ postdebate feelings of political
information efficacy remain stable or change by the end of
the presidential campaign?

Method
The data for this study were collected throughout the fall 2004
presidential campaign from a subset of participants who took part in a
larger study of presidential debates. Participants for the current
project each viewed one of the three presidential debates, and these
same study participants were contacted again following the November
2, 2004, election. Our analysis is based on a 3-point longitudinal
design, with Time 1 measuring participants’ predebate viewing
responses; Time 2, postdebate responses; and Time 3, postelection
responses from our panel participants. The three presidential debates
took place during a 2-week period (from September 30 to October 13),
and postelection responses were collected during a 3-week period
following the election (November 6 to 30).

Sample
The respondents in our panel were 32 undergraduate students
from six large southeastern and midwestern universities. Six
participants viewed the first presidential debate on September 30, 5
viewed the second debate on October 8, and 21 viewed the third
debate on October 13. The total sample consisted of 9 men (28%) and
23 women (72%) whose mean age was 21 (with ages ranging from 18
to 29). The partisan affiliations of the sample included 44%
Republican, 34% Democrat, 19% Independent, and 3% Other. Finally,
the sample was 81% Caucasian, 6% Asian or Pacific Islander, 6%
Multiracial, 3% African American, and 3% Spanish or Hispanic origin.
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Procedures
Participants were enrolled in basic communication courses at all
universities and received credit for taking part in this research. Their
participation was voluntary and anonymous. In each of the three
debate-viewing sessions at all universities, respondents first completed
printed pretest questionnaires on the evening of the debate in the
viewing lab that included demographic information and a series of
items designed to measure the respondents’ political efficacy, trust,
cynicism, and information efficacy. The respondents then watched the
90-minute debate live; immediately following the debate, without
exposure to any postdebate media commentary, the respondents
completed a posttest questionnaire, which included repeated measures
of all pretest items.2 As part of the postdebate testing, participants
were asked if they would be willing to share their e-mail addresses so
that researchers could contact them again at some point later in the
campaign to learn what they were thinking about the campaign and
candidates. Following the election, participants indicating a willingness
to be recontacted received an e-mail with a link to an online survey
that contained repeated measures of all pre- and postdebate viewing
items.

Variables and Instruments
To measure young citizens’ normative democratic attitudes, we
used a scale consisting of eight items adapted and expanded from the
NES conducted by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research
Center. Variations of these statements—provided in our Results
section—have been used in numerous political communication studies
(e.g., Kaid et al., 2000; Kaid, Johnston, & Hale, 1989; McKinney,
Spiker, & Kaid 1998; McKinney & Banwart, 2005; Spiker, 2005; Spiker
& McKinney, 1999; Wald & Lupfer, 1978). For each of the eight items,
participants responded to a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (disagree
strongly) to 5 (strongly agree). A confirmatory factor analysis revealed
acceptable loadings for the three discreet factors of political efficacy,
trust in politicians, and political cynicism.3
A four-item scale was used to measure political information
efficacy. This scale was constructed from items used traditionally to
measure internal political efficacy reflecting one’s attainment of
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requisite political information as well as level of confidence in political
knowledge (Acock et al., 1985; Clarke & Acock, 1989; Finkel, 1985;
Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). The scale included the following internal
efficacy items: “I consider myself well qualified to participate in
politics,” “I think that I am better informed about politics and
government than most people,” and “I feel that I have a pretty good
understanding of the important political issues facing our country.”
Additionally, the fourth item stated, “If a friend asked me about the
presidential election, I feel I would have enough information to help
my friend figure out who to vote for.” The combined scale achieved
high reliability levels across all testing periods, with a Cronbach’s alpha
of +.85 at Time 1, +.93 at Time 2, and +.90 at Time 3.

Results
Normative Democratic Attitudes
Our first set of hypotheses predicted that debate exposure
would produce beneficial effects on young citizens’ attitudes of political
efficacy, trust, and cynicism. Namely, we predicted that following
debate exposure, young citizens’ political efficacy and trust would
increase and their cynicism would decrease. Paired sample t tests were
conducted to evaluate changes in pretest and posttest mean scores
(where p values less than .05 are reported as significant). Results
indicate that although change did occur for each of these three
attitudes, and in the predicted direction, a significant change occurred
for only one of the three variables, political cynicism (see Table 1).
Young citizens were significantly more cynical before they watched the
debate (M = 2.94, SD = 0.82) than after watching the debate (M =
2.70, SD = 0.66), t(31) = 2.282, p = .030. Again, keep in mind that
our item response pattern was 1 = disagree strongly and 5 = strongly
agree; thus, following their debate viewing, respondents recorded
significantly stronger disagreement with the statements “One never
knows what politicians really think,” “Sometimes politics and
government seems so complicated that a person like me can’t really
understand what’s gong on,” and “Politicians often quickly forget their
election promises after a political campaign is over.”
Young citizens’ political efficacy increased following debate
exposure. Reported efficacy levels before the debate (M = 1.92, SD =
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0.78) were lower than postdebate levels (M = 1.75, SD = 0.77), and
this change in political efficacy approached significance, t(31) = 1.938,
p = .062. Thus, following their debate viewing, respondents expressed
greater disagreement with the statements “Whether I vote or not has
no influence on what politicians do” and “People like me don’t have
any say about what the government does.”
Finally, debate exposure had very little effect on young citizens’
trust in politicians. Participants’ mean trust scores registered a
negligible change, from 3.33 to 3.27, indicating that after watching
George W. Bush and John Kerry debate one another for 90 minutes,
these young citizens disagreed only slightly less with the sentiments
“Politicians are more interested in power than in what the people
think,” “One cannot always trust what politicians say,” and “One
cannot be confident that politicians will do the right thing.”

Political Information Efficacy
Our first research question asked if viewing a presidential
debate would have a significant effect on young citizens’ political
information efficacy. Table 1 shows that information efficacy increased
significantly following exposure to a presidential debate, as
participants’ predebate information efficacy was lower (M = 3.83, SD
= 0.88) than their reported information efficacy following the debate
(M = 4.09, SD = 0.82), t(31) = –3.170, p = .003. With information
efficacy items phrased in a positive manner (see Method section for
item wording), a significant increase in this score indicates
respondents became more confident in their political knowledge.

Longitudinal Analysis
Beyond the immediate effects of debate exposure, we also were
interested in understanding how young citizens’ democratic attitudes
might evolve during the course of the campaign. We first asked, in
Research Question 2, if young citizens’ postdebate attitudes of political
efficacy, trust, and cynicism would remain stable or change by the end
of the presidential election. The Time 3 (postelection) mean scores in
Table 1 reveal that by the end of the campaign, young citizens’
political efficacy (M = 2.23, SD = 1.05) dropped significantly from its
postdebate viewing level (M = 1.75, SD = 0.77), t(31) = –2.80, p =
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.009; and young citizens’ political cynicism following the election (M =
2.99, SD = 0.78 ) was significantly higher than it was at Time 2
following debate viewing (M = 2.70 , SD = 0.66), t(31) = –2.66, p =
.012. Although young citizens became slightly less trusting of
politicians by the end of the campaign, this does not reflect a
significant change following their postdebate viewing.
Our fourth research question asked if young citizens’ postdebate
feelings of political information efficacy would remain stable or change
by the end of the presidential campaign. Although young citizens’
information efficacy did continue to increase from Time 2 to Time 3,
this was not a significant increase. However, young citizens’ level of
postelection political information efficacy (M = 4.20, SD = 0.880) was
significantly higher than their predebate level (M = 3.83, SD = 0.782),
t(31) = –4.494, p = .001.

Discussion
Our hypothesized outcomes for postdebate democratic attitudes
were only partially confirmed. Young citizens did become significantly
less cynical following their debate viewing, and their feelings of
political efficacy increased at a level approaching significance.
However, debate exposure had very little influence on young citizens’
trust in politicians. When examining the pattern of attitude change
across time, and particularly change in attitudes from postdebate to
postelection, we see that young citizens actually “lost” any beneficial
effects they acquired from their debate exposure. The significant
attitude changes from Time 2 to Time 3 reveal that young citizens’
levels of efficacy and cynicism, for the most part, simply returned to
their predebate levels (in comparing predebate to postelection scores,
Time 1 to Time 3, we found no significant difference on any of the
three democratic attitude measures).
This “loss” of debate-viewing “gains” in democratic attitudes is
similar to Mutz and Reeves’s (2005) findings regarding the effects of
televised incivility on political trust. Their experimental study revealed
that even brief—20-minute—exposure to political incivility reduces
political trust; yet when contacted approximately 1 month later,
participants’ political trust had “bounced back...to the level of trust
[they] had before incivility in the laboratory” (p. 12). When we
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consider the apparent malleability of young citizens’ democratic
attitudes across the course of the campaign, and particularly their
“bounce back” from postdebate gains, we are less inclined to agree
with Miller and MacKuen’s (1979) suggestion that debate effects may
be short-lived because “the public’s memory is just not very long” (p.
290). Rather, we tend to agree with Geer’s (1988) assessment that
“actually, the effect of debates may be short lived because the
campaign continues, not because the electorate simply forgot about
the debates” (p. 489).
That the young citizens in our study reported their lowest levels
of political efficacy and highest levels of cynicism following the election
may very well speak to the campaign that continued after debates
ended in mid-October. In fact, the postdebate period is typically
regarded as the “hot phase” of the fall campaign. During the last
couple of weeks leading up to Election Day, candidates will unleash
their heaviest barrage of ads and sharpest opponent attacks to draw
clear distinctions that might motivate their base voters. This campaign
message environment may very well work to erase any beneficial
attitudinal gains resulting from earlier debate exposure and
particularly work to increase one’s level of political cynicism.
When examining the trends in our longitudinal analysis we were
actually rather surprised to find young citizens reporting their lowest
levels of efficacy at the conclusion of the campaign. Our initial
speculation had us examine our panel’s reported presidential vote
choice, speculating that such decreased efficacy might reflect
disheartened voters who had supported a defeated candidate.
However, with nearly all of our participants claiming to have voted
(31, or 97%), their presidential choice was almost exactly split with 16
(50%) voting for John Kerry and 15 (47%) voting for President Bush.
Thus, even if a postelection decrease in efficacy was spurred by
disheartened Kerry supporters, the nearly equal number of triumphant
Bush supports in our sample would likely balance this tendency.
Another potential—and we feel plausible—explanation for these
young citizens’ decreased efficacy might be explained by the time
frame during which we asked our panel to register their postelection
responses, the few days immediately following the election. It is
interesting that a prevailing media interpretation of the election’s
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outcome promulgated during this period expressed initial
disappointment in—and even criticism of—the performance of young
voters in the 2004 vote. For example, on Thursday, November 4
(following John Kerry’s eventual concession speech delivered on
Wednesday, November 3), National Public Radio’s All Things
Considered hinted that Kerry’s defeat could have come at the hands of
younger voters:
This year’s elections saw a big increase in efforts to get
young voters to the polls. Some thought John Kerry could
ride a wave of youthful first-time voters into the White
House.... With P. Diddy, Eminem, and a host of other
entertainers commanding young people to “vote or die,” the
thought was this would be a record turnout for young voters.
Well, it was... sort of. (Burbank, 2004)
This report went on to point out that although the total number of
young voters did increase, their percentage of the overall vote total
remained the same as their 2000 contribution because of the fact that
all segments of the voting population increased. A New York Times
analysis of election results was even more direct in its blame of young
voters, proclaiming, “Young voters packed less wallop on Nov. 2 than
some hoped” (Chamberlain, 2004). Finally, cable news pundit Joe
Scarborough, host of MSNBC’s Scarborough Country skipped blame
and went directly to ridiculing young voters’ election influence when he
boasted,
You know, a lot of history was made during this last
presidential election, from bloggers, to 527s, and, of course,
to all those young voters that were going to come out and
change the election. Right! Well, I’ll tell you what. Our focus
tonight is the swift boat vets and the fact that they actually
did secure a second term for George W. Bush. (Scarborough,
2004)
This dominant news narrative may very well have suggested to young
voters that their performance in the 2004 election was a
disappointment and that their political clout—their political efficacy—
was simply not very strong, especially when compared with other
segments of the electorate.
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When examining young citizens’ political information efficacy,
however, our longitudinal analysis charts a progressive strengthening
of this attitude throughout the course of the campaign. Young citizens’
lowest levels of information efficacy were found before their exposure
to the presidential debates, a campaign message that effected a
significant strengthening of confidence in their political knowledge. By
the end of the campaign, young citizens recorded their highest level of
political information efficacy, a level significantly higher than when this
measure was first taken before their debate viewing.
Our finding of a continued strengthening of young citizens’
political information efficacy following debate exposure is in line with
previous research that suggests debate viewing prompts greater
interest in the ongoing campaign, encourages citizens to seek out
additional campaign information, and prompts citizens to engage in
discussions with others about the candidates and the campaign. In
fact, these are the very types of communicative activities—the seeking
of additional information and sharing with others—that would likely
lead one to be more confident in his or her political knowledge, which
our results seem to confirm.

Conclusion
We realize the current study has several limitations. First, the
size of our panel could have been larger; yet the ability to track even
this limited number of voters allows us to understand more about
changes in democratic attitudes throughout the course of a
presidential campaign. We realize too that debates are but only one
component in a very complex campaign message environment; future
research should examine debate effects relative to other
communication forms. Also, a control group of participants not
exposed to the presidential debates would be helpful in teasing out
specific debate viewing effects. Yet even with such limitations, our
findings suggest that a presidential debate provides an effective
campaign message for enhancing young citizens’ democratic attitudes
and particularly for strengthening one’s political information efficacy.
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Notes
1. The Commission on Presidential Debates provides official viewership
figures for all televised general-election presidential debates, data
supplied by Nielsen Media Research (see www.debates.org). The viewing
audience averaged 63.1 million for debates in 1960, 65.4 million in 1976,
80.6 million in 1980, 66.2 million in 1984, 66.2 million in 1988, 66.4
million in 1992, 41.2 million in 1996, 40.6 million in 2000, and 53.4
million in 2004.

2. The survey items reported in this study were part of a larger
questionnaire that was used at each location with each session.

3. A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation using SPSS
13.0 was computed for scores on the eight items using predebate
responses. Three discreet factors emerged, identified as political efficacy,
trust, and cynicism and accounting for 31.1%, 24.1%, and 16.1% of the
total variance, respectively. Only those factors with eigenvalues higher
than 1 were considered. The rotated factor matrix loadings that were less
than 0.5 were not considered. Each subscale achieved acceptable
reliability levels, with Cronbach’s alpha levels at +.89 for efficacy, +.64
for trust, and +.66 for cynicism. As Kerlinger and Lee (2000, pp. 662663) note, for behavioral research, alpha values above +.60 are
acceptable. A factor analysis for these eight items was also computed for
Time 2 and Time 3 responses, revealing very little change from the
predebate factor structure.
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Appendix
Table 1: Effects of Exposure to Presidential Debates on Engagement Attitudes and
Information Efficacy

a. Indicates a significant difference between Time 1 and Time 2.
b. Indicates a significant difference between Time 2 and Time 3.
c. Indicates a significant difference between Time 1 and Time 3.
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